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Running	hot	and	cold:	Bhutan-India-China	relations
What	will	the	new	year	bring	for	the	three	countries?	Even	though	the	Doklam	issue	was	solved
peacefully,	its	occurrence	shows	that	a	frozen	conflict	can	run	hot	now	and	again.	Looking	ahead,	the
new	year	may	bring	new	challenges,	a	continued	status	quo,	and/or	new	opportunities	writes	Sarina
Theys.
The	summer	of	2017	was	marked	by	a	frozen	border	dispute	that	turned	hot	between	Bhutan,	China
and	India.	The	disputed	area	is	a	geographical	space	known	as	the	Doklam	Plateau	which	is	believed	to	be	part	of
Bhutan’s	territory.	Causes	of	the	flare-up	are	contested.
Some	commentators	argue	that	the	conflict	erupted	after	China	was	caught	building	a	motorable	road	in	the	disputed
area	whereas	others	blame	the	destruction	of	Indian	bunkers	by	the	Chinese	army	located	in	the	same	area.	A	look
at	the	map	below	shows	the	disputed	area	which	is	located	near	the	tripoint	where	the	three	countries	meet:	China’s
Chumbi	Valley	in	the	north,	Bhutan’s	Haa	valley	to	the	east	and	the	Indian	state	of	Sikkim	to	the	west.
Source:	Foreign	Brief
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The	dispute	is	a	hangover	of	historical	events	such	as	the	annexation	of	Tibet	by	China	in	1959.	China’s	control	over
Tibet	not	only	changed	the	nature	of	the	shared	border	between	Bhutan	and	Tibet	but	also	the	nature	of	China’s
relationship	with	some	of	its	immediate	neighbours.	Mao	claimed	that	Tibet	was	the	palm	of	China’s	hand	of	which
the	five	fingers	were	identified	as	Bhutan,	Ladakh,	Sikkim,	Nepal,	and	Arunachal	Pradesh.	In	other	words,	Tibet
became	a	strategic	platform	from	which	China	tried	to	enlarge	its	territory	and	by	doing	so,	aimed	to	increase	its
sphere	of	influence	in	the	region.	The	map	below	depicts	Tibet	and	the	so-called	five	fingers.
Source:	yesheydorji.blogspot.co.uk
China	failed	to	annex	the	so-called	five	fingers.	Bhutan	and	Nepal	managed	to	maintain	their	sovereignty	and
territorial	integrity,	Ladakh	and	Arunachal	Pradesh	remained	Indian	states,	whereas	Sikkim	was	annexed	by	India	in
the	1970s.	Formal	border	talks	between	Bhutan	and	China	started	in	1984	and	a	peace	agreement	was	signed	in	the
1990s	entitled	the	Maintenance	of	Peace	and	Tranquillity	in	the	Bhutan-China	Border	Areas.	This	agreement	was
important	for	Bhutan	as	it	officially	recognised	its	sovereign	status.
The	border	dispute	between	the	two	Asian	hegemons	and	the	small	Buddhist	kingdom	has	been	going	strong	for
more	than	six	decades.	Besides	the	Doklam	Plateau,	disputed	areas	include	the	Jakarlung	and	Pasamlung	valley	in
the	north	of	Bhutan.	The	latter	two	are	important	to	China	given	their	proximity	to	Tibet,	and	the	former	is	salient	to
both	China	and	India	as	it	overlooks	the	Chumbi	Valley	and	the	Siliguri	Corridor,	also	known	as	the	Chicken’s	Neck.
The	Siliguri	Corridor	is	strategically	important	to	India	as	it	is	a	gateway	to	India’s	north-eastern	states.	Chinese
control	over	the	Doklam	Plateau	is	therefore	perceived	by	India	as	a	major	security	threat	as	it	may	result	in	isolating
the	north-eastern	states	from	India’s	mainland.
The	2017	border	dispute	was	not	the	first	confrontation	between	India	and	China.	Hot	phases	also	occurred	in	1962
and	2014.	Contrary	to	the	1962	Border	War,	the	2017	skirmish	was	solved	peacefully.	There	was	no	‘physical	scuffle’
between	the	Indian	Army	and	China’s	People’s	Liberation	Army.	The	conflict	was	solely	expressed	through
antagonistic	rhetoric	and	verbal	threats.	Although	both	sides	claimed	victory	and	the	status	quo	was	restored,	it
was	reported	that	‘the	Chinese	got	what	they	wanted’	as	they	only	‘went	back	250	metres	to	maintain	peace	while
India	had	to	give	up	patrolling	the	area	where	two	destroyed	bunkers	had	existed.’
Bhutan-India-China	Relationship	in	2018:	What	will	the	new	year	bring?
Even	though	the	border	conflict	was	solved	peacefully,	its	occurrence	shows	that	a	frozen	conflict	can	run	hot	now
and	again.	Looking	ahead,	the	new	year	may	bring	new	challenges,	a	continued	status	quo,	and/or	new
opportunities.
The	biggest	challenge	would	be	another	flare-up	of	the	border	conflict.	In	all	likelihood,	the	next	flare-up	may	result	in
a	military	escalation	as	Indian	army	officers	revealed	that	India	is	re-prioritising	its	next	development	plan	(2018-
2023)	to	invest	in	infrastructure	development	–	including	roads,	infantry	weapons,	and	surveillance	equipment	–
along	the	border.	The	Prime	Minister	of	India	underlined	India’s	strategic	plan	when	he	stated:	“It	is	clear	that	the
security	of	our	country	is	our	priority…Be	it	sea	or	borders,	be	it	cyber	or	space,	India	is	capable	of	tackling	every
security	challenge.”
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The	King	of	Bhutan,	His	Majesty	Jigme	Khesar	Namgyel	Wangchuck	meeting	the	Prime
Minister	in	New	Delhi	in	November	2017.	Image	credit:	by	India	Ministry	of	External	Affairs/Flickr
India’s	strategic	plan	will	result	in	an	increased	border	militarisation.	This	practice	constructs	the	contested	area	as
an	imagined	war	zone	which	has	the	potential	to	become	real.	Furthermore,	mobilising	material	resources	can
backfire	as	it	may	result	in	a	reactive	response	from	China	leading	to	a	never-ending	circle	of	conflict.
Alternatively,	the	status	quo	can	be	maintained.	This	scenario,	however,	forms	a	barrier	to	change.	Although	a	status
quo	prevents	the	situation	from	getting	worse,	it	also	prevents	it	from	becoming	better.
The	last	scenario	is	a	formal	border	agreement	between	Bhutan	and	China.	This	will	resolve	the	border	dispute	and
may	end	the	Indian-Chinese	hostility	at	the	border.	There	is,	however,	an	elephant	in	the	room.	India	does	not	like
the	idea	of	a	border	agreement	between	Bhutan	and	China.		Although	the	Doklam	Plateau	is	in	Bhutan’s	territory,
India	acted	as	if	it	was	her	territory.	This	is	problematic	as	it	shows	that	India	is	still	interfering	in	Bhutan’s	policies,	a
practice	which	it	officially	yielded	when	Article	2	of	the	1949	India-Bhutan	Friendship	Treaty	–	which	reads	that
Bhutan	will	be	guided	by	the	advice	of	India	on	external	relations	–	was	removed	in	2007.
Thus,	India	acts	out	of	self-interest	as	Bhutan	functions	as	a	buffer	state	between	China	and	India.	This	self-interest
was	also	expressed	by	a	senior	high	ranking	Indian	military	officer	who	stated
‘…the	Doklam	Plateau	is	private	property	of	the	Royal	Family	–	belongs	to	the	King…	the	King	of	Bhutan	may
consider	selling	the	Doklam	Plateau	to	India	so	that	this	bone	of	contention	is	resolved	permanently.’
It	remains	to	be	seen	which	scenario	will	materialise	in	the	near	future.
This	article	was	originally	posted	on	the	IAPS	blog	and	can	be	viewed	here.	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,
and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics.	Please	read
our	comments	policy	before	posting.
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